Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.
- Article 18, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)
Why begin with a quote from the UDHR, and how is it relevant to this week’s readings? The UDHR marks the birth of universal human right’s discourse, it is the world’s cumulative pronouncement after World War II that all persons share a common humanity, and as such it represents a fundamental shift in the way the West viewed the world. This marked the end of colonialism and imperialism, it changed the way different cultures were viewed by the West, and it change the way the West viewed religion. (This is a broad, idealistic picture but this is not the place to debate the pitfalls of the UDHR and the human rights movement.) As such it can be used as a conceptual marker for our modern discourse on religion. For it is in this document that a paradigm shift that created our current method of analyzing the world was born. I argue that although Masuzawa claims to be taking a historical approach to the development of World Religions discourse (Introduction, p. 13) she glosses over (at least in the chapters we read for this week) the historical context within which these developments took place. She does not address some of the major ideological and philosophical trends of the times that shaped this discourse, such as: manifest destiny, skepticism and evolutionary theory, something I find especially important. She says: “Our task, then, is not to cleanse and purify the science we have inherited- such efforts, in any case, always seem to end up whitewashing our own situation rather than rectifying the past- but rather it is a matter of being historical differently.” (p. 21) What does she mean by “being historical differently”? Is this contingent upon our own historical placement? If this is so, then is it not vital to understand the historical situation of the early World Religions scholars so we can better understand how we can be or are historical differently? Is saying a scholar was the product of his/her times a type of attempted cleansing or justifying?
Looking at this from a different angle, we might ask whether our problem with the history of World Religions scholastics is rooted in the different conception of the “other” that they had. The UDHR, to use my contemporary example, is based on the idea that the other is also human, so shares a common set of inherent “rights,” that is inherently the same although culturally diverse. Thus, in contemporary Western scholasticism the other is on equal footing with us and although this other may have a different religious tradition this tradition shares an equal legitimacy with our religious tradition. (This generalization is overtly idealistic, but purposefully so to highlight the general assumption that may or may not be practically employed by the individual.) This is in contrast to the various ideas of the “other” that existed in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries. Smith gives a good illustration of this difference in reference to the explorer/colonist’s view of the natives’ “religion.” Smith explains:
“[Religion] is a category imposed from the outside on some aspect of native culture. It is the other… who [is] solely responsible for the content of the terms… In constructing the second-order, generic category ‘religion,’ its characteristics are those that appear natural to the other.” (Smith, p. 269)
We find here that the “other” is defined as culturally strange, truly separate from us, and therefore the only way this strangeness can be understood is to find/create symbols in that otherness that conform to our norm. Yet, constant contact leads to an erosion of this strangeness. Van Voorst, in relation to contact with religious texts, points out that: “The more we genuinely encounter world scriptures in their full range of reception and use, the less likely we will be to inject our own biases into the scriptures of others.” (Van Voorst, p. 11) Thus, over time, according to Van Voorst, our biases diminish due to our evolving understanding of the foreign religious texts. Does this explain the slow evolution in the historical approach to World Religions from the superiority of Christianity to the democratization of religions? Yet at the end of his essay Smith says something that throws a wrench into this idea. He says: “‘Religion’ is… a term created by scholars for their intellectual purposes and therefore is theirs to define.” (p.281) Does this mean we trade old biases for new ones? Instead of finding a “truer” perspective do we just change our definitions and therefore our language game?
Returning back to the idea of history. Masuzawa’s very last sentence in Chapter Two should be a particularly sobering thought for us. She says: “Surely, our thorough lack of interest in their logic is ultimately to the detriment of our own historical understanding.” (p. 104) Should we be concerned then, not with finding means of separating us from them, but with understanding the preconceptions of their times that guided them and how this gradually changed? After all we are the heirs of the Western scholarly tradition, should we not understand the past logic of this tradition before we seek to create a new logic of our own?
Finally, the lingering questions for me after reflecting on Masuzawa, Van Voorst, and Smith are: what biases and/or assumed “Truths” does scholarship today hold that might make a future academia blush at us the way we blush at the early founders of World Religions dialogue? Is our only hope to strive to be individuals ahead of our times, or is this an act of hubris that will lead us to disaster? Is it better to be a Maurice who had good intentions, that is, a scholar who strives for accuracy but whose work falls short, or a Hardwick, a scholar who is rigorous in an effort to uphold the bias of his time (Reference Masuzawa pp. 96-97)? Or ultimately are these things we have little to no control over?
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4 comments:
Rebekah, I think that the "lingering questions" posed at the end of your entry are really thought provoking. The idea that we may not have control over whether or not we are/become "a Maurice" or "a Hardwick" is challenging--it raises interesting questions about the extent to which one is able to identify personal bias. Masuzawa's decision to highlight Sharpe's juxtaposition of Maurice's good intentions and Hardwick's commitment to the bias of his time is interesting...it makes me wonder if the things that constitute a bias are just as debatable as the things that constitue good intentions. Can't one still have good intentions and be subject to personal bias?
Yeah, I also wonder if we have "little to no control" over these things...especially if it is only hindsight that is 20/20.
Rebekah, you bring up an interesting critique of Masuzawa's argument so far! I agree, she hasn't provided much context in terms of ideological and philosophical trends related to the formation of the discourse on world religions. Still, the readings had me convinced, and wondering what happens next, and when did things change? I think you are right to question whether saying a scholar is the product of their time an attempt at cleansing or justifying the discourse. We should study the past preconceptions that existed in scholarship, but it is important to gain an understanding of when and how things change.
As for your final thought on what biases exist in scholarship today, I think it may be impossible to avoid personal bias creeping into our work. To reflect on Natalie's question, I believe one can still have good intentions and be subject to bias. I don't doubt that these authors Masuzawa lists who created these revealing book titles did not have good intentions of their own.
Well written Rebekah.
I believe that humanity will always have, if not create, an “other” to contend with.
Do we trade old biases for new ones? Don’t we always? even if we don’t intend to. Hindsight is 20/20 and yet we seem to find that we are destined to miss the mark when it comes to issues as broad as religion.
Speaking to your last point, I think that a lot of what we do now is lean on the extreme of over sympathizing with “the other” so as to avoid the biases that Masuzawa outlines in her book. But I think we have been cornered in how we conduct our research; almost as though we are paying for the mistakes of the previous century’s scholars.
Those future scholars will have to pinch my pale, dead cheeks very hard to make me blush. I am certain I am engaged in scholarship later generations will condemn. Your reflections are very well though-out. I would like to consider the following:
"We find here that the “other” is defined as culturally strange, truly separate from us, and therefore the only way this strangeness can be understood is to find/create symbols in that otherness that conform to our norm".
Incommensurability of cultures is the little hasty pronouncement of modern scholars with an effusive conscience. Should one examine the aims, goals, objects of worship, etc., one would find them quite commensurable. Humans, as UDHR notes, deserve the same rights. Why? Because we share the same sensibilities, goals, and humanity! Translating the cultural expressions of one people to be understandable to another presents problems. But it is not without merit, nor inadequate to our purposes.
“Surely, our thorough lack of interest in their logic is ultimately to the detriment of our own historical understanding.”
Logic is also something commensurable. In fact, the logic written of by Aristotle has been employed throughout the world, albeit in different terms. It hasn't been until the 20th century that logicians have attempted to posit new logical systems, most of which are terrible. I would argue that we reason the same way, just in different languages, and with different ideas. But that doesn't mean that logic is ours to impose upon others. It is everyone's, but appears different when different values are held.
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