When I first started the readings for this week I was perplexed because I had no idea what to say about the topic or how to critique the articles, then I got to Mahmood’s article. I want to engage the topic of ritual as it relates to virtue ethics. I was amazed that Mahmood never mentioned the term “virtue ethics.” She dances around the topic, mentioning Aristotle’s habitus (pp. 11-13), but she never directly confronts it, which is rather disappointing because it would be a helpful insight in analyzing her findings. In what follows I will explore virtue ethics and its relation to ritual/performance in the context of Mahmood’s article.
It is important to start by clarifying what I mean by virtue ethics. Virtue ethics, which has Platonic and Aristotelian roots in the west and Confucian roots in the east, is concerned with producing “perfect” individuals, individuals who intuitively, or to use Mahmood’s term, spontaneously, do the good. For the purposes of this discussion I will define virtue as the capacity to not only know and do what is right/good but also to feel what is right/good, to do the right thing for the right reasons. Mahmood says of her subjects that: “In interviews with me, mosque participants identified the act of prayer as a key site for purposefully molding their intentions, emotions, and desires in accord with orthodox standards of Islamic piety.” (p. 2) She further says that these women are intent on initiating religious transformation in a society where they see religious devotion performed from cultural habit rather than actual devotion. Thus, they seek to cultivate an ideal virtuous self who spontaneously acts rightly with inherent “natural” religious conviction.
There are many branches of virtue ethics, each with its own specific theory as to how this is achieved and what it entails, so for the sake of brevity I will only employ the theory of al-Farabi. Al-Farabi, known as “The Second Teacher” (second only to Aristotle), is considered the first Islamic political philosopher and greatly influenced all philosophical thought that followed him. I choose to use his theory because it raises many questions inherent to the position of the women interviewed by Mahmood; most importantly: Is virtue primarily a habit? Can ritual/habit produce a state of being? And, does religion produce actual virtue or mere habit?
In the remainder of this entry I want to focus on how virtue is acquired by analyzing the three questions presented in the previous paragraph. The first question that asks if virtue is primarily a habit, deals with the central core of virtue ethics. If virtue is solely the habit of doing the right thing, then it is possible for someone to be virtuous, do what is right, without actually believing it is right or feeling that that is the only thing to do. For example, the women in Mahmood’s study expressed the distinction between those who perform the religious rituals out of cultural habit and those who perform them out of religious conviction. The first group consists of individuals who do the right thing, out of habit and social conformity, but who internally would rather do something else or feel a compulsion to do what is morally wrong. The second group is made up of individuals who strive to do the right thing with the right state of mind. Thus, virtue cannot be mere habit. Al-Farabi explains that: “The traits of the soul by which a human being does good things and noble actions are virtues.” (al-Farabi, “Selected Aphorisms,” p. 12) Virtue is a trait, not a habit. It is a part of the individual’s being, not just a custom that he/she adopts.
This leads to the second question concerning whether or not ritual/habit can produce a state of being. In the second footnote of the article Mahmood discusses the impact ritual has on the self, the distinction between the private and public, and the Enlightenment idea of the self articulated by Rousseau. She says: “This view of the unique privatized subject whose essence cannot be captured in the social conventions of a given society seems to resonate with the conception of ritual action as necessarily devoid of ‘authentic, individual’ emotions.” (Mahmood, p. 20) I want to contrast this with a quote from al-Farabi. He says:
“It is not possible for a human being to be endowed by nature from the outset possessing virtue… But it is possible for one to be endowed by nature disposed for virtuous or vicious actions in that such actions are easier for him than other actions… That natural disposition is not said to be a virtue, just as the natural disposition for the actions of an art is not said to be an art.” (al-Farabi, “Selected Aphorisms,” p. 17)
The position that Mahmood was articulating posits that the true self of the individual is separate from the public self that the individual displays, therefore, since ritual is a part of the public self, it never has any authenticity with regard to the true/essential self. Within this framework ritual or habit could never produce a state of being, it could only shape the public self. It could shape one of the modes of being, but not produce an actual state. In contrast, al-Farabi suggests that some individuals are born with a natural capacity for virtue. It is a disposition that he/she is born with, similar to the disposition to become a painter or a doctor. However, having this disposition does not mean the individual is that. Just as an individual has to learn how to be a painter or a doctor, he/she also has to learn how to become virtuous. This learning entails adopting good habits and cultivating a proper mind-set, thereby producing a virtuous state of being. I think it is fairly obvious that the women Mahmood studied are working within a Farabian framework rather than an Enlightenment one.
This leads us the final question concerning whether religion/religious rituals produce actual virtue or mere habit. If virtue has to be cultivated, and only some individuals are born with a disposition for virtue, then can only those with a natural disposition for virtue become virtuous? What would the women Mahmood interviewed say about this position? Regarding politics al-Farabi claimed that only the king/leader has to be virtuous, the subjects merely have to habitually do what is good. This is because, while the king can chastise the people who err, if the king errs he/she will lead the people into error. Does this have any impact on Mahmood’s study? The answer to the question concerning virtue and habit is it produces both. Should the emphasis then be on the individual rather than ritual?
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
4 comments:
Hey Rebekah!
I feel like I have a better understanding of some of the questions that Mahmood is and is not grappling with after having read your blog. In particular, your pairing of her article with al-Farabi's thought was revealing. I find it especially helpful in elucidating what exactly Mahmood means by habitus and what she is (or isn't) engaging with with respect to this notion. Thank you!
Two of the questions that you raise really stand out in my mind. You ask,
"If virtue has to be cultivated, and only some individuals are born with a disposition for virtue, then can only those with a natural disposition for virtue become virtuous? What would the women Mahmood interviewed say about this position? "
My gut-reaction to the first is to say no, the state of being virtuous is not solely available to those naturally disposed to virtue. I think that the word "cultivated" is evocative of this feeling--virtue must be cultivated, which implies that it can be cultivated if the individual so desires. I think then, that what is more important than what we are naturally disposed to is what we wish to cultivate.
Is it too bold of me to suggest that Mahmood's subjects would share this perspective?! I'm thinking of the story that she relates concerning the twenty-something-year-old woman speaking of her difficulties with morning prayer (pp. 831-832). While to a certain extent she is the object of criticism, I also see her being there as an affirmation of her willingness to cultivate virtuous devotional practice. One could argue that she is an example of one who is not naturally disposed to virtue relative to Mona. However, she is still a part of the religious movement that Mona and others like her are trying to initiate within the devotional community of their society--she is attempting (at least from my perspective) to cultivate virtue. Just some thoughts!
Hey Rebekah,
I love the insight you bring to our readings! I really appreciate your definition and discussion of virtue ethics.
As soon as you started talking about it I wondered that if virtue ethics is concerned with “perfecting” individuals, does Ibn Arabi’s theory of the perfect human being fall under that category?
I think your questions about whether religion produces virtue or habit, and the cultivation of virtue are very interesting! I don’t think that people with a natural disposition to virtue are the only ones who can cultivate it. But I wonder, can the cultivation of virtue exist outside of religious rituals? Are there any religious traditions that acknowledge this?
I really enjoyed your entry this week, Rebekah. Your perspectives on virtue and the perfect individual are very insightful.
I guess I have been much more inclined towards understanding performance and ritual in religion as a communicative gesture between the individual and God or a transcendent state of existence. Besides purification, I thought it rare that rituals deem one more virtuous. Virtue is something that corresponds more with morality and ethics and that is requires free will. But I would like to hear more about your thoughts on performance and our ability to use it as method in research.
Rebekah, a clear and concise exposition which renders problems within ethics and ritual fascinating.
I am particular interested in your discussion of the private/public dichotomy in religious life. It would appear to mirror the observed/observer distinction from the performance readings this week. This leads me to question whether the academic need be concerned with the private life of the religious individual? The answer would seem to be "Of course!". But does it really matter what people do in their own private world? So long as it doesn't negatively impact on the lives of others, on the public one might say. This is an interpretation in which the public dimension is the realm of the ethical. That, the public must set limits on what an individual can do and say in public, but not in the private life of the individual. This ethical dichotomy is incredibly tricky, and obviously cannot be posited in such a simple manner. It will encounter many problems, but it also has important implications for the scholar's work.
Post a Comment