“Philosophy is not the reflection of a pre-existing truth, but, like art, the act of bringing truth into being.”( Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception. Preface p. xx.)
Is there an inherent distinction between the sexes that makes male and female perceptions of the world definitively different/separate to the extent that there are two “worlds”? Kinsley, p 7-9, seems to suggest this in his discussion of the different sets of religious interpretation/meaning given to symbols by men and women. Can the study of religion, or the study of anything for that matter, be done outside of gender perspective? I think a brief digression into phenomenology will show that these separate “worlds” of Kingsley are not inherent within the world, but due to human constructions imposed upon the world, therefore there might be a pre-sexualized/genderized realm of shared experience.
I began with the quote by Merleau-Ponty, because it reveals a side to phenomenology that I found obscured in Young’s article. Philosophy “paints” a picture of the world, that is, it shows the world, as the individual perceives it. This perceiving that Merleau-Ponty is talking about is pre-sexualized perception, He is largely concerned with what he terms a pre-reflective perception, perception before it is categorized and objectified. This is the world before it is appraised. It is from this perspective of experience before categorization that phenomenology stems. Young, then is missing the point of phenomenology so to speak when she says:
“The early phenomenologists now seem hopelessly androcentric with their use of the generic ‘he’ and their universalizing language that never asks whether the experiences of men might differ significantly from those of women, and so on. Moreover, because ‘essences’ have been determined by male phenomenologists on the basis of male experiences alone (whether intentionally or not), women have had good reason for criticizing this kind of scholarship.” (Young, p 31)
Before addressing this quote it is important to mention the problems with Young’s classification of phenomenologist. To begin with, she lumps all philosophical phenomenologists into one vague group, only offhandedly mentioning the differentiation among them. This is problematic, for her proceeding discussion of the phenomenologist terminology suffers, being overly general and lacking substance. Finally, she begins by separating philosophical phenomenologists from phenomenologists of religion, but in the body of her article it becomes hard to distinguish which group she is making claims about. Thus, in the quote above I am unclear if she is talking about one group specifically or both in general. This being the case, I will discuss the passage in relation to the phenomenologist philosophers.
Young’s picture, I would argue, is outright wrong. First, I think the accusation of using “he” for the generic human is rather petty. Secondly, to say that these philosophers never questioned whether female experience might differ from male is insulting and untrue. (It is interesting to note that she only mentions Simone De Beauvoir in a footnote. I hardly think Beauvoir would have been silent about this topic in her conversations with Merleau-Ponty and Sartre!) For example, Sartre in “Being And Nothingness” directly addresses the question of sex/gender and sexuality. He says:
“Man, it is said, is a sexual being because he possesses a sex. And if the reverse were true? If sex were only the instrument and, so to speak, the image of a fundamental sexuality? If man possessed a sex only because he is originally and fundamentally a sexual being as a being who exists in the world in relation with other men?” (Sartre “Being And Nothingness,” p. 499)
Sartre is asking whether an individual’s sexuality is based on his/her gender, or if the individual possesses a gender due to his/her being a sexual being, that sexuality is more encompassing than specific gender. An individual’s gender is a contingent part of his/her facticity. This means that there will be different experiences based on gender, but sexuality is not an accident based on gender. Thus, phenomenologists such as Sartre, contra Young, do acknowledge this difference, but may not explicitly explore it in detail because they are dealing with experience in a more abstract context. Can this abstract discussion of experience be gender neutral? Boyarin, when discussing Irigaray, affirms this perspective:
“Different attitudes of the body in sexual intercourse (on enclosing, the other being enclosed), the capacity to menstruate, gestate, and lactate, all of these form a sort of material base for a subjectivity that is different from that of men but do not prescript what that subjectivity will consist of or how it will be lived.” (Boyarin, p 130)
There are different experiences based on biological difference, however this does not imply that these different subjectivities are inherently determined by biology. Thus it is valid to study how this (female) subjectivity has been constructed and lived within a specific historical period, but it is invalid to suggest that this (female) subjectivity is a completely separate entity. Are scholars continuing this oppression as “other” by creating Women’s Studies?
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4 comments:
Hey Rebekah!
I really appreciate you providing an alternative view of phenomenology and its ideological background. Young served as my introduction to this branch of philosophy so, it was good to hear your opinion on what she presents--it helped me think about her argument in a more informed manner. I especially like the way in which you have challenged her criticism of the phenomenologists as having articulated solely male experiences. Your nuanced discussion of Sartre as evidencing phenomenology's sensitivity to questions of sexuality and gender is particularly apt.
I have been thinking about the last question that you pose to your reader and have to say that I think that this is a complicated (and important) issue that you bring up. To what extent is Women's Studies really liberating female perspectives and history? To what extent is this discipline rendering women's experiences even more abstract and distant? In asking these questions, I am remembering what you say at the beginning of your blog:
"I think a brief digression into phenomenology will show that these separate “worlds” of Kingsley are not inherent within the world, but due to human constructions imposed upon the world, therefore there might be a pre-sexualized/genderized realm of shared experience."
I think that this is well-put and that the possibility of the "female world" and the "male world" being social constructs is one that merits further investigation...I just wonder how, in the midst of feminism's trendy appeal, one might be able to speak of a shared, "human" experience. How might we be able to credibly speak of universals when there seems to be such a stigma attached to discussions of something as broad as "human experience"? Just some thoughts that your blog made me think of!
Rebekah, as always, your blog provides interesting discussion of philosophy and a new perspective on the readings that really helps to enrich my understanding of them (and the issues they address).
I want to comment on your introductory question:
“Is there an inherent distinction between the sexes that makes male and female perceptions of the world definitively different/separate to the extent that there are two “worlds”?”
Although we do share humanity, there is of course an obvious biological distinction between males and females. There can also be a socially constructed difference between the sexes. Gender, as Clark discusses in her article, is be defined by some scholars as a system of social relation (234). This concept of gender is a social, human construction. These distinctions are thus created by society and are not natural.
In his article, Kinsley writes on page 7: “It is clear in many cases that it is simply not accurate to suppose that the meaning of a particular religious text, event, or symbol is the same for males and females.”
I wonder, is it also not accurate to assume that experiences, interpretations, or meanings are different for men and women? This is may be why Kinsley wrote “many” instead of all cases. I think it is important to study women’s religion, but I also think that men’s religion should be a focus as well. It may also be valuable to study the human religious experience. Can all three modes exist at once? Are we doing an injustice by subscribing to these distinctions between the sexes?
Very well-thoughtout, Rebekah. Your criticism of Young is pointed, and reveals her continuation of the 'othering' trend even within feminism. That said, I would like to briefly address this statement:
"Are scholars continuing this oppression as “other” by creating Women’s Studies?"
This is an outstanding question to posit at the end of your blog. I believe that, in part, the creation of women's studies has continued to confine women to the 'Other'. The focus should be on integrating a focus on gender-specific studies into the prevailing academic disciplines, without diminution of there significance. As I mentioned in my own blog, overvaluation of feminism as method is dangerou, and one of its effects is to further women as 'Other'. Feminism needs to be an important feature of broadly conceived 'human' studies.
Rebekah, great entry!
I agree that there are pre-sexual experiences shared by men and women!
I also agree with your statement “it is invalid to suggest that this (female) subjectivity is a completely separate entity”
However, when you ask: “Are scholars continuing this oppression as “other” by creating Women’s Studies?” I don’t think they are. I believe that those who endured long standing oppression or that have been (or still are) directly discriminated against deserve to have their particular cases and history honored. By honoring I mean given a level of special acknowledgment and attention. The history of violence against women is a whole field that I believe does well in the hands of the women’s studies department.
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