These chapters by Clark, if anything, left me incessantly cursing postmodernism. As a student of philosophy I enjoy the intellectual games that postmodernism provides, but not being a postmodernist myself I cringe at all mention of postmodernist theory. The problem I have with postmodern theory, as presented by Clark, is the emphasis on literary theory. (Not that I have anything against literary theory, but I have been taught to make a clear distinction between the work I do and literary theory and history.) This literary perspective culminates in the discussion of text and context. What is a text? Does it need to be read within a historical context? Is there a transcendent means to the text? Can we discover the author’s intention and true meaning? They are important ideas to discuss, but not necessarily explicitly relevant to philosophical discussion; it is interesting look at how philosophical theory is applied, but would be anachronistic to apply it to earlier philosophy. This is not to say that philosophers do not interpret their predecessors, for example, Kant’s critique of empiricism, and Deleuze’s critiques of Hume, Spinoza and Kant, but one could not apply Deleuze’s philosophical method to Hegel’s concepts in an attempt to understand Hegel.
Postmodern philosophy seeks to understand the way the world is, that is, it seeks to be prescriptive rather than proscriptive. Therefore, it rejects the transcendent and finds meaning only in the immanent. Looking at critiques of contextualism Clark summarizes Derrida, “To believe that the reader must locate one particular and exclusive context in order to understand a text, Derrida concludes, is itself a ‘metaphysical assumption.’” (p. 142) There is no transcendent being to a text, or anything for that matter. Assuming that there is a true context within which to understand a text, is to assume that transcendent being. There is no Truth with a capital T. Put another way; there is no meaning only meaningfulness. In a way philosophers such as Derrida and Deleuze are merely describing what they saw occurring in philosophical scholarship. Scholars of philosophy constantly battle with each other about interpretations. In this battle, where concepts are constantly re-defined and re-interpreted, no Truth emerges. The lasting value of this enterprise is the meanings that are formed. How could a scholar apply this literary theory that Clark espouses, which is derived from a particular school of philosophy, to a different philosophical school? Or does this only apply to historians of ancient Christian studies?
I think the best way to sum up my frustration with postmodern theory is to look at the infamous postmodern generator. Here we have a program that randomly generates essays using the recursive grammar of postmodern dialogue. Some critics of postmodernism take this as a proof of its falsity. Can you find “meaning” in the essay generated? If language is an arbitrary system of essentially meaningless signs then are all texts no better than one of these essays? This is a fun rebuttal to make against postmodernism, but I think it misses the point of the original philosophy. Postmodernism does not declare that there is no meaning. We can have meaning without transcendence. But this meaning is multifarious. It is not a theory of the proper way to read or analyze a text, but a theory of what occurs when reading a text. There are as many texts as readers; there are as many Platos or Derridas as there are readers of Plato and Derrida. That is why we continue to have scholarly debates about these things.
I think reading the chapters for this week highlighted the difficulty I am having in understanding this concept of methodology and its application to my work. Clark was addressing history and literary theory in relation to ancient Christian Studies. She was using as methodology philosophers in the discipline I am working within. That does not work for me. I can understand the relation of reader, author and text in terms of postmodern theory, in terms of structuralism, conceptualism, etc., but this is a dialogue for literary theory.
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4 comments:
Rebekah, thank you for a frank and challenging article. I agree with some of your frustrations (and "fun" rebuttals)
I felt a bit drained from this week's readings.
I want to speak to your discussion of capital T truths and Meaning. I don't know if I agree that there can be meaningfulness without holding up that text (or whatever it is that is meaningful) to Meaning.
I believe in capital T truths, regardless of whether or not I will ever be able to articulate what they are. We have undeniable limitations in our ability to interpret any object, but I want to challenge us to consider the very idea of having a "right" to know (knowledge itself, or knowledge held in someone else or a text). I don't mean to sound esoteric but I think that as much as we want to loosen the grips of mechanisitc or proscriptive literary theories, we are always bound by some absoloute convictions. Although we may never come to cognize Truths, I argue that we nevertheless live and act on their existing grounds.
I would never want to undermine "formed" meanings or truths, but I think that they are a synthesis of smaller meanins and truths (if they weren't their synthesis would not hold)
Hey Rebekah!
I think that you have made some really interesting distinctions in your blog this week. The two that stick out most to me are:
1) "there is no meaning only meaningfulness"
2) "[postmodernism] is not a theory of the proper way to read or analyze a text, but a theory of what occurs when reading a text"
To comment on 2) first, I think that viewing postmodernism as a tool for understanding what takes place when we are reading is helpful because it (postmodernism) seems well-equipped to entertain a multiplicity of interpretations, which I think is the inevitable outcome of multiple readers reading the same text. I am still a little unclear though, as to why you feel it is not a proper way to read/analyze a text. I understand that you feel its strong attachment to literary theory somewhat limits its application but, I wonder if you feel this way when reading all kinds of texts (even works of fiction) or just those (and particularly those philosophical texts) that were written before postmodernism entered the scene?
Your idea that there is no meaning only meaningfulness fascinates me...I feel as though I am incapable of getting around defining meaningfulness as anything but an expression of meaning and I wonder where this comes from. I would be interested in talking about this point more in tomorrow's class because I think that it is an important one to think about.
I also just wanted to add that the frustration that you express in your opening paragraph regarding the way in which Clark tries to fuse philosophy, literary theory and history is one that I share--not so much in relation to Clark but more generally. I am in a history class right now and coming from an English background, I am having a really hard time knowing how to critically engage with primary and secondary historical resources. The distinction between literary theory and history as separate approaches seems as though it should be obvious and yet, when I really think about it, I find that I can't quite explain how to interpret a historical source without referring to/relying upon some form of literary theory. I'm confused by this and would love to hear more of your thoughts on how you see the two as different!
Rebekah, another fascinating blog in which you manage to boil-off the the fat. I am going to disagree, though.
Philosophical systems are commensurable, and arguing for their incompatibility is short-sighted. After all, intellectual history is composed of the interaction of seemingly disparate systems of thought. Profit has been obtained through combining philosophical systems that, to thinkers of the past, seemed impossible to conjoin to other methods. Such assimilation might not reveal objective truth in the long run, nor may all systems relate, but what is has accomplished is a multiplicity of possible truths on which we can place our bets. As I wrote in my first blog, the best we can hope for is viable probabilities - and the integration of variant systems can provide for this.
Hello Rebekah!!
I think you pose questions from this week’s readings in a clear-cut way (for example, “[Do texts] need to be read within a historical context?” and “Can we discover the author’s intention and true meaning?”). However, I understand how these debates may not be relevant to your field of study. It seems to me that the literary theory Clark is advocating may only be appropriate for early Christianity.
Just to talk about your discussion of Derrida’s critique of contextualism, Derrida argues that contexts can never absolutely be determined, and to believe that readers must locate one exclusive context is a “metaphysical assumption” (Clark, 142). This opens the doors for multiple interpretations, and in turn as you say, no truth with a capital T emerges. But what I am not sure that I understand what a “transcendent being” to a text is? What do you mean by this?
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